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Placing Neoliberalism: The rise and fall of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger  
 
Abstract 
In this paper we provide an account of the property-led boom and bust which has brought 
Ireland to the point of bankruptcy.  Our account details the pivotal role which neoliberal 
policy played in guiding the course of the country’s recent history, but also heightens 
awareness of the how the Irish case might in turn instruct and illuminate mappings and 
explanations of neoliberalism’s concrete histories and geographies. To this end, the paper 
begins by scrutinising the terms and conditions under which the Irish state might usefully be 
regarded as neoliberal.  Attention is then given to uncovering the causes of the Irish property 
bubble, the housing oversupply it created, and the proposed solution to this oversupply.  In 
the conclusion we draw attention to the contributions which our case study might make to the 
wider literature of critical human geographies of neoliberalism, forwarding three concepts 
which emerge from the Irish story which may have wider resonance, and might constitute a 
useful fleshing out of theoretical framings of concrete and particular neoliberalisms: path 
amplification, neoliberalism’s topologies and topographies and accumulation by 
repossession. 
 
Key words: Ireland, financial crisis, Celtic Tiger, housing, National Assets Management 
Agency, ghost estates, neoliberalism, path amplification, accumulation by repossession, 
neoliberal topographies 
 
Introduction 
The Irish economic model which prevailed between 1993 and 2007 was widely heralded as a 
beacon of what the deep liberalisation of a small open economy might deliver. Indeed, the 
so-called ‘Celtic Tiger’ years saw a dramatic transformation in the social and economic life 
of a country that had, until the start of the 1990s, been a relatively poor and peripheral state, 
perched on the edge of Europe with a weak indigenous economy and a foreign direct 
investment sector characterised by low-skilled, branch plant manufacturing.  In the 1990s, 
Ireland embraced deregulation, entrepreneurial freedoms and free-market principles and 
aggressively courted high valued added export oriented foreign direct investment (see 
O’Riain, 2004). The result was a rapid shift to high-skilled manufacturing, a phenomenal 
growth in the service sector, the development of a domestic consumer society, a rapid growth 
in population through natural increase and immigration, and a housing and property boom 
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(see Allen 2007; O’Hearn 1998; O’Riain 2004; Bartley and Kitchin 2007; Jacobson et al. 
2006; Moore and Scott 2005). Politicians, policy makers, economists, academics, 
practitioners, think tank gurus and journalists from around the world flocked to Ireland to be 
inducted in the art of best practice in fast track growth and former Irish leaders have gone on 
global lecture tours espousing the so-called benefits of the ‘Irish model’ of neoliberal 
economic reform for countries wishing to fast-track modernisation. 
 
But since 2008, as a number of worldly dramas have unfolded, so too has the Celtic Tiger 
model unravelled. The domino effect of the global financial crisis unearthed the fragility, 
over-extension, and tenuous alignments of the international financial markets. Since then, the 
world has been plunged into recession, banks have collapsed, others have been the recipients 
of generous tax-funded bailouts, and national and supra-national governments have 
scrambled to resurrect their economies from the detritus of the recession.  The effects of the 
international financial crisis, while practically ubiquitous, have been felt more strongly and 
deeply in Ireland than in many developed countries.  As a small open economy, Ireland was 
always going to be exposed to fluctuations in the international markets (O’Hearn, 1998; 
Jacobson et al, 2006), but the extent of this exposure was significantly exacerbated by the 
home-grown inflation of a property bubble (O’Toole 2009).  Indeed,  the Celtic Tiger era of 
economic expansion was split into two periods: the first period (1993- 2002) characterised by 
export-led growth dominated by FDI and the second period (2002-2007) involving a property 
boom largely involving Irish developers capitalised by Irish banks, who in turn were 
borrowing from European banks.   
 
As the global crisis deepened, the Irish property bubble burst and the vast over-exposure of 
Irish banks to toxic property loans became apparent.  The collapse of the property and 
banking sectors led to a contraction in the wider economy, with the drying up of credit, 
markets and tax receipts, leading to a huge hole in the public purse; an extensive bank 
bailout, including the establishment of the National Assets Management Agency (NAMA) 
that has acquired €88b of property debt and rolled up interest from Irish banks; bank 
recapitalisation (Bank of Ireland) and nationalisation (Allied Irish Bank, Irish Nationwide 
Building Society, Anglo Irish Bank); massive state borrowing to service the bank bailout and 
the public sector spend; rising unemployment; and plummeting house prices.  Given the 
perilous economic state, this ultimately led to the €85bn IMF-EU bailout in November 2010, 
and the collapse of the Fianna Fail led government in February 2011. 
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The response of the Irish government (like other national governments) thus far has 
amounted to ‘more of the same’; to patch up, rather than transform, the political economic 
system.  As such, there is seemingly little appetite for any radical departure from orthodoxies 
and dogmas which have demonstrably failed.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the international 
pressure, Ireland’s response to its crises represents little more than an anxious toeing-the-line 
in economic policy, cow-towing to the demands of the IMF, and nostalgically dreaming of 
those halcyon days of perpetual growth.    Indeed, Ireland is being touted as an exemplar of 
the benefits of austerity and is being held up as a model for Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain 
to follow.  
 
In many ways, the story of the rise and rise of neoliberalism in Ireland, the rise and fall of the 
Irish economy, and the Irish property boom and bust, provides an insight into the travails of 
proto-neoliberalism in the secular world. And yet to date there has been insufficient and 
inadequate dialogue between scholarship on neoliberal ideology and practice and the fate of 
Ireland’s Celtic Tiger.  The relative paucity of such dialogue can be attributed to two sets of 
confusions: the appropriateness of the concept of neoliberalism and the failure to apprehend 
the Irish state as a neoliberal state.  Firstly, the extent to which the term ‘neoliberalism’ may 
be said to map on to any meaningful empirical referent has become the subject of 
considerable debate (Larner 2000). Indeed, within some intellectual communities, we note 
the palpable mood of hostility which has arisen against those who might use and abuse the 
notion (Hackworth 2007). Whilst many commentators within Ireland, both populist and 
academic, speak loosely and often carelessly about an Irish neoliberalism, there remains 
within more studied commentary a wariness in  overstretching the concept and a nagging 
doubt about its utility.  Secondly, in some respects Ireland postures as a somewhat 
ambivalent case-study of neoliberalization; ideologies of neoliberalism have come to assume 
a ‘commonsense’ status within the country’s political class to the extent that the term has 
rarely been explicitly articulated in national political debates. When it has been deployed by 
the Irish state itself, the label neoliberalism has rather confusingly been bound up with the 
notion that the Irish economic model represents a hybrid formulation – to use the analogy 
popularised by former Tanaiste Mary Harney in 2000, somewhere between Boston 
(American neoliberalism) and Berlin (European welfarism).  
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Undoubtedly, the limited application of scholarship on neoliberalism to Irish economic 
history has hampered, and been to the detriment of, academic comprehension of Ireland’s 
spectacular rise and fall, and in particular to scholarly appreciation of the roots of Ireland’s 
property boom and subsequent property crash. Reciprocally, it has also impoverished the 
ongoing agenda of figuring out appropriate ways in which to theorise neoliberalism’s various 
past, present, and emerging actually existing forms. In this paper, we propose that Ireland is 
indeed uniquely placed to both instruct and be instructed by theoretical literature on 
neoliberalism and its discontents. We offer the ideas of path amplification, neoliberalism’s 
topologies and topographies and accumulation by repossession as central to the structuration 
of neoliberalism in Ireland and potentially useful additions to ongoing efforts to theorise 
neoliberalism’s wider biography. 
 
An Irish Neoliberalization? 
At the heart of the concept of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ is the notion that proto- 
neoliberalism is an economic experiment which has become woven into localities in different 
ways as a consequence of their unique social, cultural, economic, political and institutional 
histories. Brenner and Theodore (2002: page 351) note the ‘path dependent’ nature of 
neoliberal restructuring projects ‘insofar as they have been produced within national, 
regional, and local contexts defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, 
policy regimes, regulatory practices and political struggles’. In these divergent contexts, they 
have identified key moments of what they call “creative destruction”, involving the 
dismantling of particular institutional forms and the construction of new (de)regulatory 
apparatus. Other strands of work have argued for understanding neoliberalism in terms of 
governmentalities (Larner, 2000), and as a ‘mobile technology’ (Ong, 2006).  England and 
Ward (2007, page 8) suggest that there are important similarities, ‘discursively and materially 
in the “restructuring” of markets for currency, energy, public services, transportation and so 
on’, which highlight the shared characteristics of state neoliberalization, but that the 
contingency of the ‘project’ on place-specific market and regulatory structures means that it 
cannot be theorised as a coherent set of global processes. 
 
The propagation of the ideology of neoliberalism of course betrays a long and colourful 
history. For instance, and representing only one example,  before crashing onto the shores of 
both the United Kingdom and the United States in the 1980s in the guise of Thatcherism and 
Reaganism, neoliberalism was long experimented with and refined and rejigged in the 
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context of IMF imposed Structural Adjustment Programmes on bankrupt nations in the 
developing world. There is certainly a tradition of scholarship that has preserved an interest 
in these multiple past and present laboratories. But it might also be argued that that recent 
work within Anglo-American Geography has tended to prioritise a limited number of case 
study sites, both spatially and temporally. Firstly, Brenner and Theodore’s (2002) assertion 
that the urban scale now constitutes the most appropriate entry point for empirical 
explorations of the grounding of neoliberalism in concrete histories and geographies has  
generated a disproportionate drift in interest towards the (western) city.  Secondly, to date, 
the principal antecedent context has been the Fordist Keynesian welfare state.  Neoliberalism 
has generated a period of creative destruction and has junked, metamorphosed and 
recalibrated prior Fordist Keynesian institutions. And much recent work has sought to 
develop the New Urban Politics literature to map a purported epochal transition in urban 
governance from urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989,  Cox 1993, 
Cox and Mair 1989, and Hall and Hubbard 1996). 
 
Arguably, the development of the concept of actually existing neoliberalism has been 
colorated, but also limited, by the selective field sites which Anglo-American Geographers 
have chosen to work on.  The Irish case endorses the need for a consideration of a wider 
range of scales of analyses and spaces and places and an appreciation of prior histories in the 
longue duree and a deeper reach into the past. Our proposition is that Ireland’s interlacing 
with neoliberal ideology has been mediated largely by institutions operating at the level of 
the nation state and within a particular political culture and system inflected by the long 
history of Anglo-Irish relations and the country’s emergence as an independent postcolonial 
state. In this sense, the Irish case can be read as an exemplar of a much wider and richer 
historical geography of encounter between neoliberal ideology and the postcolonial legacy. 
We propose that Ireland’s neoliberal model has been shaped by at least four important 
historical factors. 
 
First, British colonisation of Ireland, and annexation through plantation, has created a long 
history of conflict in Ireland over ownership and propriatorial control over land and property. 
Historically, various strands of Irish cultural and political nationalism and Irish 
Republicanism fore-grounded land and property ownership and land reform as central to their 
mission. Irish cultural and political life is thus marked by a fierce and combative defence of 
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the rights of the citizenry to exercise almost complete freedom and autonomy over land and 
property. 
 
Second, living under the yoke of British political control, the Irish political model developed 
in ways which privileged local social relations and in particular a clientalistic and patronage 
species of politics. The craft of votes for favour and graft were honed in the rural Irish village 
and through time became sedimented and naturalised. The result is that Irish politics is 
marked by a triumph of local politics over party and national politics (see Collins and 
Cradden, 1997). This was combined with a highly centralised bureaucracy inherited from the 
former British colonial administration (Breathnach, 2010, page 1186).  Moreover, local 
politicians wield power in ways which have actively subordinated the Irish planning system.  
As a result, Irish planning has never achieved the same status as it has in much of Europe and 
has always been weakened and compromised by localism, cronyism and corrupt political 
practices.    
 
Third, although Irish nationalism was infused with strains of Marxist and Socialist politics 
arguably Ireland’s revolution was one of the most conservative in modern history. Since 
Independence, Irish political life has been dominated by the oscillating fortunes of two 
hegemonic, right of centre and conservative nationalist parties: Fianna Fail and Fine Gael.  
These parties were formed out of the Irish Civil War and reflect not left and right divisions in 
ideology but pro- and anti-treaty sentiments at the time of independence. Irish political 
cleavages then for the most part do not pivot around ideological differences.  
 
Fourth, in the years immediately following Irish independence, Ireland’s principal economic 
policy was one of import substitution. External capital was to be heavily regulated, limited, 
and policed, and domestic industries were to be nurtured and protected.  By the late 1950s it 
was becoming evident that this model had and was impoverishing Ireland.  From the 1960s 
on Ireland embraced a model of a liberal and open economy and aggressively sought to court 
export oriented manufacturing, piloting and adopting policies which would later be labelled 
neoliberal.  
 
These four factors shaping the Irish political landscape have produced a certain species of 
neoliberalism in Ireland which is perhaps best characterised as ideologically concealed, 
piecemeal, serendipitous, pragmatic and commonsensical. Indeed, successive Irish 
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governments have never had an explicit neoliberal ideology (apart from a small number of 
influential Ministers) (Kirby 2010).  Ideology thus remains largely hidden in the apparatus of 
Irish politics.  Its presence is barely articulated and often invisible.  And yet Ireland was 
characterised over the Celtic Tiger period by a range of practices that bear important 
similarities discursively and materially with key processes of neoliberalization (Peck and 
Tickell 2002).  As opposed to an ideologically informed project, such as those implemented 
by Thatcher in the UK and Reagan in the USA during the 1980s (see Harvey 2007), Irish 
neoliberalism was produced through a set of short-term (intermittently reformed) deals 
brokered by the state with various companies, individuals and representative bodies, which 
cumulatively restructured Ireland in unsustainable and geographically “uneven” ways.   
 
Breathnach (2010) argues that the tension between the overwhelming concentration of 
employment and population in the East of the country and the political, clientelistic 
motivation towards “balanced regional development” has resulted in an inability on the part 
of the state to make spatially selective decisions in order to strategically plan for economic 
growth.  During the Fordist period, in which Ireland operated as a branch-plant 
manufacturing centre, this resulted in an extreme form of industrial decentralisation – 
manifested during the 1970s by the state’s construction of ‘advance’ factories in 156 
locations – but was significantly exacerbated from the 1980s onwards, once services became 
the main source of employment growth.  Although intended as a way of addressing this 
imbalance, the National Spatial Strategy published in 2002 was effectively disabled by these 
same political features.  Moreover, when export-led growth slowed down, the entrenched 
system of local clientalism was not superseded by indigenous entrepreneurship that 
capitalised on Ireland’s new industrial composition, but rather new wealth was invested in 
property.  The Irish state’s moves towards neoliberalisation, then, could be seen to operate at 
two scales: the international level whereby the state attempted to create a vibrant and open 
economy that would attract FDI due to the ease of conducting business and generating profit, 
and the national/local level whereby the state pandered to their political allies by cultivating 
the conditions for a property boom, which was equally characterised by a lack of spatial 
selectivity.  As the property sector began to take precedence over FDI as the major generator 
of state revenue, and due to reliance on indirect taxes from this sector, this created an 
economic model that could only perform adequately in a situation of perpetual growth.  This 
need for perpetual growth was ingrained both structurally in the state’s taxation system, and 
discursively in the Celtic Tiger myth itself.    
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The Irish neoliberal model ostensibly takes elements of American neoliberalism (minimal 
state, privatisation of public services, public-private partnerships, developer/speculator led 
planning, low corporate and individual taxation, light to no regulation, clientelism) and 
blends them with aspects of European social welfarism (developmental state, social 
partnership, welfare safety net, high indirect tax, EU directives and obligations) (Kitchin and 
Bartley 2007).  Rather than being the result of some well conceived economic master plan, 
however, the Celtic Tiger was the outcome of a complex set of unfolding, interconnected, 
often serendipitous processes, held together by a strategy of seeking to attract and service 
foreign direct investment.  Thus, Ireland exhibits a peculiar brand of ‘emergent’ 
neoliberalization (McGuirk, 2005).  The model is perhaps better described as a series of 
disparate policies, deals, and actions that were rationalised after-the-fact, rather than 
constituting a coherent plan per-se.  As such, the claim that the Irish model sits politically 
somewhere between ‘Boston and Berlin’ is not so much an indication of a country pioneering 
a new model of neoliberalism, as it is suggestive of the ways in which new policies and 
programmes were folded into the entrenched apparatus of a short-termist political culture 
shadowed by low-level clientelism, cronyism and localism that works to the detriment of 
long-term, state-wide planning (O’Toole 2009).   
 
Much of the policy transformations of the Celtic Tiger era movements were then, to an 
extent, the outcome of a certain political pragmatism – doing what was necessary at the time 
to satisfy the needs of various sectors of the voting public – rather than being characterised 
by clearly delineated periods of ‘roll back’ and ‘roll out’ neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 
1994).  The rolling out of neoliberal mechanisms such as privatisation and Public Private 
Partnerships were rarely handled in any sort of ideologically informed or systematic manner, 
and the state often failed to achieve the appropriate balance between private sector risk and 
public sector reward in these projects (Hurst and Reeves, 2004; Kirby and Jacobson, 2006; 
Reeves, 2003; Palcic and Reeves, 2005).   Despite the relatively small receipts yielded to the 
taxpayer by privatisation, the state has continued to roll out privatisation into diverse service 
areas such as school buses, refuse collection, motor vehicle testing, and urban car parking 
and clamping, and initiate public private partnerships with respect to public buildings, social 
housing, and road infrastructure (Barrett, 2004).  However, while the state rolled out 
neoliberal policy mechanisms in fragmented and piecemeal ways into different sectors, this 
was not accompanied by an equivalent rolling back of social welfarism –  unemployment and 
child support and other benefits remained relatively high – although it should be noted that a) 
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the overall quality of services in many areas of the public sector (such as Health, Education, 
and Public Transport) failed to reflect the magnitude of the dramatic transformations of the 
nation’s wealth during this same period (OECD, 2008)., b) social disadvantage was not 
adequately addressed during this period (NESC, 2005) and c) the response to the current 
crisis has seen savage cuts in these same sectors. Moreover rather than pitting the state 
against the trade unions, the period of Irish neoliberalization was characterised by “… the 
dense networks of institutions of ‘social partnership’ extending across all spheres of the 
political economy and integrating local actors, state agencies, and European Union 
Programmes … [that became] an institutional mechanism of public governance through 
almost all spheres of public life” (O’Riain, 2004, pages 9-10).  These agreements traded 
work and pay related concessions for union docility, and were used by the state as a means of 
manufacturing labour stability.  Additionally, “[u]nlike most other countries in Europe, 
Ireland has consistently rejected the model of decentralised decision making even in policy 
areas, which many observers might suggest are most sensibly located and managed by the 
local or regional sub-national levels of government. Ireland’s system of local governance is 
traditionally poorly organised, in receipt of very limited funding, and responsible for a very 
limited range of policy” (Stafford and Payne, 2004: p. 3).  As a result, Kirby and Jacobson 
(2006, pages 28-40) argue that the neoliberalization of Ireland has been flimsy and 
unsustainable and that the Irish state failed to recognise that “market liberalisation requires a 
more robust and socially responsible state” to achieve equality and stability. Similarly the 
Irish sate has failed to adequately embed FDI industries over the boom period through 
investing in and growing indigenous companies. Indeed, Ireland’s dependence on foreign 
investment is starkly identifiable by the degree to which GDP exceeds GNP (O’ Hearn, 
1998).    
 
What we need to take away from this discussion is that these particularities of the Irish state’s 
flirtations with neoliberalism are not anecdotal or addendum to the technologies more 
‘representative’ of neoliberalisation globally.  Rather, these particularities have been central 
to how actually existing neoliberalism has emerged in the Irish context.  As such, we find the 
concept of creative destruction, which sits at the heart of ideas such as path dependency and 
path trajectory problematic and offer instead the concept of path amplification. The relentless 
focus on the paradigmatic case of neoliberalism’s assault on and dismantling of Fordist 
Keynesian, and cultural, political, and historical infrastructures at the level of the city, has 
arguably effaced the recognition that in some cases neoliberalism actually finds itself in 
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harmony with, rather than in opposition to, prior institutional histories. Path amplification 
points to the importance of forms of path trajectory in which history serves to amplify rather 
than slow down neoliberalism’s ambitions. Although often seen as a burden, weight, and 
source of friction, in fact in some cases pasts can serve as catalysts, lubricants, and 
wellsprings for neoliberal reforms. In light of these arguments, the following section looks 
more closely at the Irish property boom as indicative of the actually existing ways in which 
these processes converge.   
 
Actually Existing Neoliberalism in Action: The Irish Property Boom and Bust 
 
In the ten years between January 1996 and December 2005 an unparalleled 553,267 housing 
units were built in Ireland, with a total stock of 1.733m units in 2005 (DEHLG 2009).  By 
2007, Ireland, along with Spain, was producing more than twice as many units per head of 
population than elsewhere in Europe (see Figure 1).  This building frenzy was accompanied 
by phenomenal growth in house prices. The average new house price rose from €78,715 in 
Dublin, and €66,914 for the country as a whole in 1991, to €416,225 in Dublin (a 429% 
increase) and €322,634 for the country as a whole (382% increase) in 2007 (DEHLG 2009).  
Not unsurprisingly, second-hand homes follow the same trend, costing on average €76,075 in 
Dublin in 1991, and €64,122 for the country as a whole, rising to €495,576 in Dublin (551% 
increase) and €377,850 (489% increase) across the country in 2007.  In the same period, 
house building costs and wages only doubled (Brawn 2009).  In Q3 1995 the average 
secondhand house price was 4.1 times the average industrial wage of €18,152, by Q2 2007 
secondhand house prices had risen to 11.9 times the average industrial wage of €32,616. 
 
Figure 1: about here 
 
Similarly, the cost of land spiralled, dramatically increasing in price in 2005 and 2006, with 
land jumping in value from just under €10,000 per hectare in 1998 to over €58,400 per 
hectare in 2006 (Savills HOK 2007).  This made Irish land the most expensive in Europe, 
nearly twice the cost per hectare of any other European country and three times greater for all 
but four countries (Spain, N. Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands), despite having a largely 
unrestricted planning system.  Land price inflation was driven by developers competing for 
urban brownfield sites, agricultural land being sold for housing development, and individuals 
buying sites for one off houses (S. Kelly, 2009).  The result was that land became a 
  11 
significant component of housing cost, up to 50 percent as against a European average of 10-
15% (O’Toole 2009).   
 
Correspondingly, the total value of mortgage debt increased from €47.2 billion in 2002 to 
over €139.8 billion at the end of 2007, with the average size of a new mortgage €266,000, 
nearly double the 2002 figure (CSO 2008).  Moreover, loans to developers for land and 
developments sky-rocketed.  As Honohan (2010: 26) notes, “At the end-2003, net 
indebtedness of Irish banks to the rest of the world was just 10 per cent of GDP; by early 
2008 borrowing, mainly for property, had jumped to over 60 per cent of GDP.  Moreover, the 
share of bank assets in property-related lending grew from less than 40 per cent before 2002 
to over 60 per cent by 2006.”  By 2008 Ireland’s property bubble was already starting to 
slowly deflate, but the global financial crisis provided a redoubtable pin.  
 
The Daft.ie house price report for Q4 2010 (Daft 2011) detailed that asking prices, based on 
stock advertised through its services, were down on average c.-14% in 2009, on top of 
decreases of -19% in 2009 and almost -15% in 2008.  The average asking price for a 
residential property was just over €222,000, €145,000 below the mid-2007 peak.  The drop in 
asking price from peak prices varies geographically, with the smallest drop in County 
Limerick (-29%) and largest drop in Dublin city centre, where prices were down -49.6% at 
the end of 2010.  The Permanent TSB/ESRI Index reported in January 2011 that the average 
national prices, based on mortgage data, had fallen to Q2 2002 levels, with a 38% decrease in 
prices since they peaked in Quarter 4 2006, falling from €311,078 to €204,830 (outside of 
Dublin from €267,484 to €174,570 (-34.75%); in Dublin from €427,946 to €237,480 (-
4.53%)).  Many economic commentators predict that house prices will fall in excess of 60% 
from peak values (e.g., M. Kelly 2007; Whelan 2010a).  Similarly, rents fell for seven 
quarters in a row to Q1 2010, with private rents being almost 25% below their peak value in 
Q2 2008 (DKM 2010).  House prices have depreciated to the extent that over 250,000 
households are in negative equity (c. one third of all mortgages) and, as of the end of Q4 
2010, the Central Bank reports that 44,508 mortgages were in arrears for 90 days or more and 
another 35,205 had been restructured (together totalling 10.13% of residential mortgages) 
(Finfacts 2011).  Further, there has been a steep decline in land values since the height of the 
boom, reduced 75-98 percent depending on location.   
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DKM (2010) reports that from 2006 to 2010(est.) the total value of construction output fell 
from €38,631m to €11,733 (a drop of 69.6%).  Further, the number of construction workers 
fell from their Q2 2007 peak of 269,600 to 105,700 in Q2 2011 (CSO 2010).  Property 
related tax receipts (stamp duty, capital gains tax, VAT, development levies) have also 
dropped dramatically given the much smaller percentage of sales and the reduction in new 
commencements.   
 
It is now abundantly clear that during the Celtic Tiger period, property supply and demand 
became disconnected so that when the bubble burst the state has been left with a staggering 
level of oversupply. The particular ways in which the property sector emerged over the Celtic 
Tiger period offers an insight into both how the geographies of neoliberalism were 
spatialisised within the Irish context and how this in turn has produced and deposited new 
neoliberal geographies.  While the literature has predominantly focused on the former 
category (the spread of neoliberalisation between places), we suggest that the landscapes and 
geographies that this subsequently secretes have been equally important in conditioning the 
course of neoliberal trajectories.  These topographies and topologies of neoliberalism, 
therefore, warrant attention not only as effects of neoliberalisation but as also productive 
elements in the continuing evolution of neoliberal geographies.  The way in which 
neoliberalism was contaminated and enfolded within the entrenched conditions of Ireland’s 
political and economic culture was instrumental in the articulation of specific relationships 
between the state, market, and civil society and in the deposition of particular geographies.  
These relationships, as manifested through the property bubble, produced a cannibalising 
form of capitalism (not unlike the practices that took down the international financial 
markets) that evolved through a solipsistic financialised logic: house prices rose while 
(counter intuitively to market logic) houses were built to excess.  Ireland was in the middle of 
a building and land speculation frenzy when the crisis initiated, and which although it 
deflated relatively fast led to 244,590 units being built between January 2006 and December 
2009 (that were connected to the ESB electricity grid).  This is despite the fact that in April 
2006, the Census revealed that 266,322 housing units were unoccupied (216,533 vacant units 
and 49,789 holiday homes; 15% of stock).  The preliminary results of the 2011 Census report 
a total housing stock of 2,004,175 of which 294,202 units were vacant (including holiday 
homes), with many areas of the country having vacancy levels above 25% (see Figure 2) 
 
Figure 2 here: 2011 housing vacancy in Ireland 
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One highly visible result of housing supply being out of sync with housing demand has been 
the creation of a new phenomenon, so-called ‘ghost estates’.  Our research detailed that there 
were 620 such estates in Ireland at the end of 2009, where a ‘ghost estate’ was defined as a 
development of ten or more houses where 50% of the properties are either vacant or under-
construction (Kitchin et al., 2010),  while a Department of the Environment and Local 
Government survey in May 2010 revealed that there are 2,846 unfinished estates in the 
country, 777 of which meet the criteria of a ‘ghost estate’, and only 429 of which were active 
at the time of the survey.  The total number of units in these estates is 121,248, with planning 
permission for an additional 58,025: 78,195 units are occupied.  Of the 43,080 units that are 
unoccupied, 23,226 are complete, 9,976 nearly complete and 9,854 where construction has 
started.  There are multiples of unfinished estates in every county in the state (see Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3: about here 
 
In addition to housing and land there is also an oversupply in offices, retail and hotels.  In 
Dublin, 23% of office space (some 782,500 sqm) is vacant (Savills HOK 2010).  By the end 
of 2010 there was estimated to be over 2m sqm of shopping centre space and 1.32m sqm of 
retail park space in the state, double that of 2005 (CBRE 2010).  At the end of 2008, there 
were 905 hotels with 58,467 rooms, 15,000 of which are deemed excess to supply (26%) 
(Bacon 2009). 
 
Much of the literature has highlighted that neoliberalisation entails not so much a retraction 
of the state as opposed to the deployment of different types of state interventions.  Similarly, 
the Irish property bubble was not only the result of deregulated markets, but was facilitated 
by a range of contributory factors.  There is no question that Ireland did need from the early 
1990s onwards to cater for a significant transformation in its demographic profile.  Between 
1991 and 2006 the population of Ireland grew by 714,129 (20.25%) from 3.525m to 4.239m, 
with the number of households growing by 440,437, up from 1.029m to 1.473m (CSO 2006).  
The growth in population was driven by both immigration and natural increase.  Household 
growth was also driven by household fragmentation.  One would have thought that such 
changes in demand would have been sufficient to drive market response, but they were 
accompanied by a range of other policies and practices. 
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Tax incentive schemes initiated under the 1986 Urban Renewal Act allowed developers to 
claim back tax on income over a ten year period, and were integral to kick-starting 
regeneration. Initially, the Department of Finance introduced tax incentives in order to 
promote growth and stability, particularly in inner city areas. Urban renewal schemes were 
introduced ‘in an effort to alleviate the increasing problem of dereliction and dilapidation 
which had affected large parts on the inner areas of towns and cities nation-wide’ 
(Department of Finance, 1999). A number of urban renewal schemes ran from 1986 to 2008 
(termination date depending on the scheme and a number were extended), including a Town 
Renewal Scheme (100 towns throughout the state covered), Living Over the Shop (LOTS) 
and a Seaside Resort Scheme (15 towns covered) which enabled access to Section 23 tax 
relief on capital expenditure incurred in the construction, refurbishment or conversion of 
rented residential accommodation.  Section 23 encouraged development for rental purposes 
(including holiday homes) by allowing developers and small investors to offset tax up to 
90% of direct costs occurred against income for up to ten years.  These schemes also marked 
the beginning of a new entrepreneurial approach to urban development in Ireland, which was 
specifically manifested in an effort to make Dublin fit for purpose for the new forms of 
economy that were becoming spatially fixed in cities in the post-industrial era.   
 
Many critics noted the neoliberal character of these urban strategies, and despite being 
widely criticised in terms of their redistributive effects on local areas (Corcoran, 2002), they 
were successful in terms of bringing new wealth to the capital and, over time, attempts were 
made to replicate the model in other Irish cities (O’Callaghan and Linehan, 2007).  The 
stimuli for development were supplemented with state funded redevelopment projects such 
as the International Financial Services Sector (IFSC) in Dublin docklands, the Digital Hub, 
and the regeneration of Temple Bar as a cultural quarter that were significant in attracting 
inward investment in advanced producer services and digital industries (MacLaran and 
McGuirk, 2001; Montgomery, 1995; Moore, 2008).  These tax initiative and redevelopment 
schemes were essentially deals struck between the Department of Finance and the private 
sector, with little role afforded to local authorities.   
 
 The urban tax relief schemes were accompanied from June 1998 by the Pilot Rural Renewal 
Scheme for the Upper Shannon Region (introduced under the Finance Act, 1998).  The 
scheme was designed to encourage people to live and construct new dwellings in designated 
areas and to promote new economic activity and consisted of two main elements were: (1) 
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business tax incentives: tax relief for the expenditure incurred on the construction or 
refurbishment of industrial buildings (from July 1st, 1999); and (2) residential property tax 
incentives: tax relief for both owner occupiers and renters (Department of Finance, 1999).  
The result was the massive incentivisation of building long after such incentives were 
needed.  In the case of the five counties in the Upper Shannon Scheme – Longford, Leitrim, 
Cavan, Sligo and Roscommon – housing stock was increased by 45,053 (49.8%) between 
2002 and 2009, from 90,491 to 135,544 dwellings, with 1 in 3 houses built in this period (see 
Figure 4).  Between the 1996 and 2006 censuses 30,695 houses were built in these counties 
and yet household numbers only grew by 18,896 – in other words, house building was 
progressing at a pace well in excess of household growth.     
 
Figure 4: about here 
 
Somewhat running against notions of balanced and sustainable development advocated in 
national spatial planning policy, the boom in construction encouraged local authorities to be 
pro-growth because it enabled the accrual of development levies (in the absence of more 
sustainable local residential property taxes), with local councillors pursuing zero-sum games 
with regards to their constituency where if one area got a certain kind of facility or 
development, then their area needed the same (hence several regional shopping centres in 
each region instead of one).  Chambers Ireland (2006) reported that development levies had 
risen from €0.11bn to €0.55bn between 2000 and 2005, representing 13.6% of local 
government expenditure.  This is indicative of how new neoliberal interventions in the 
property sector were interwoven with the localised nature of Irish politics to produce 
particular spatial articulations of capital.   
 
This was replicated at the national level through the government’s pro-cyclical fiscal policy 
and taxation system, which worked to both boost the construction industry and to make it 
critical to sustaining public spending, rather than acting as a counterweight to ensure 
sustainable growth.  Stamp duty, capital gains taxes and VAT were significant contributors to 
the public purse, despite capital gains tax being halved to 20% in 1997, justified by 
normative neoliberal faith in the market that the sale and purchase of assets becoming less 
costly would free capital to be invested within the wider economy. Significantly, 
development land was also included under capital gains tax, in an attempt to ensure that a 
greater amount of land was released for enterprise purposes.  Davy Research (2006) reported 
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that the property market accounted for 17% of total tax revenue in 2006, up from 5% in 
1998.  Revenues from stamp duty on property transactions were c. €2.98b in 2006, up from 
387m in 1998, and there were c. €3.2b in VAT receipts (CSO 2008, Davy Research 2006).  
Stamp duty rates were lowered several times between 2001 and 2007, and the ceiling on 
income tax deductibility of mortgage interest for owner occupiers was increased four times 
between 2000 and 2008 in order to further stimulate the housing market (Honohan 2010).  In 
addition, a significant number of people were employed in the construction and related 
sectors and construction was accounting for a significant chunk of growth in GDP (in 2006 
construction accounted for 9% of GDP and 10.4% of GNP; DKM 2008, cited in CSO 2008).   
 
In turn, the planning system became beholden to development, being pro-growth in 
orientation with a presumption for development operating, and was consistently undermined 
with localism, clientelism, cronyism and low-level corruption.  At the local scale, individuals 
and developers lobbied and sought to curry favour or do deals with county councillors and 
constituency TDs for zoning and permissions in return for support, votes and remuneration of 
various kinds (favours, kick-backs, fees for ‘planning consultancy’, etc).  The Irish planning 
system lends itself to such a relationship as a result of its division of legislative and executive 
functions between councillors and planners.  The formulation and adoption of development 
plans and zoning decisions fall under the remit of elected local councillors, whilst the 
planning authority adjudicates over planning applications (with the planning authority a part 
of the local authority that local councillors oversee).  The function of local authority planners 
is as advisors on all development planning matters, rather than being formal decision makers; 
elected representatives have the final say on all development plan and zoning matters, and 
are under no obligation to take the recommendations of experts into account.  Moreover, 
councillors can use mechanisms such as Section 140 (of the Local Government Act 2001 – 
formerly Section 4 of the City and County Management (Amendment) Act, 1955) to override 
a specific planning decision.  And, while local authority staff are legally bound not to engage 
in work that might imply a vested interest, there is no such monitoring for councillors. This is 
exemplified by examples of elected representatives ‘double jobbing’ as planning agents (or 
consultants).   
 
The result was too few checks and balances to stop excessive zoning and permissions being 
granted, despite the fact that detailed demographic profiling would have indicated limited 
demand in many locations, and the absence in many cases of essential services such as water 
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and sewerage treatment plants, energy supply, public transport or roads.  This is exemplified 
with respect to land zoning.  In June 2008, the DEHLG recorded that there were 14,191 
hectares of serviced land zoned nationwide for 462,709 potential new units (and an additional 
30,000 hectares of unserviced zoned land), with many counties having enough land zoned to 
last many years.  For example, Monaghan, which had a stock of 21,658 houses in 2006 had 
enough serviced land zoned for an additional 18,147 units, which would cater for a 
household increase of 83% and last over 50 years if households continued to grow at the 
1996-2006 rate.  The national average is 16.8 years.   
 
At the national level, developers and vested interest organisations lobby and pressure 
Ministers with respect to regional and planning policy formation and key legislation (Allen, 
2007).  The property sector thus maintains close relationships with the major political parties, 
providing funding donations, the use of services and facilities, access to elite networks, 
employment/directorships after politics, and so on, in order to influence development plans, 
zoning and planning decisions, and planning policy.  As the revelations of the Mahon 
Tribunal into planning corruption have suggested, this relationship has been characterised as 
one of mutual benefit, along with direct and indirect bribery and coercion of elected officials 
at all levels of government (see O’Toole 2009).   
 
The vicious circle of politicians and developers was completed by the domestic banking 
sector, which got involved in a lending war driven by personal bonus schemes and inter-bank 
rivalry to generate record annual profits, flooding the market with development and mortgage 
capital that catered to speculator and buyer demand, but also actively encouraged it.  Rather 
than using their own deposits to underpin loans, given favourable lending rates, banks 
borrowed money from other international banks and private equity funds to offer evermore 
easier forms of credit to home buyers and investors.  Utilising the international financial 
markets for credit “greatly increased banks’ vulnerability to changing market sentiment” 
(Honohan 2010: 6).  This reckless lending, often conducted without proper due process and 
exceeding stress test criteria, was exacerbated by financial deregulation and a regulatory 
system that failed to adequately police the banking sector (Ross 2009; Murphy and Devlin 
2009).  The involvement of international banks in the Irish property crash forms another 
critical component to understanding the relational geographies of the financial crisis.  The 
flow of international capital into Irish institutions effectively provided the means by which 
the property boom could occur.  While we are acutely aware of the importance of these 
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financial flows to the predicament that Ireland currently faces, and indeed the fate of the 
entire Eurozone, it is nevertheless both empirically and conceptually beyond the scope of the 
current paper to account for this in detail.  Rather, we limit our analysis to the manifestations 
of these processes within Ireland.  
 
The Honohan Report (2010) makes it clear that there were catastrophic regulatory and 
governance failures both in the financial sector itself (with respect to senior management 
decisions, bank auditors and accountants, and financial intermediaries such as mortgage 
brokers) and the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland which 
overemphasised process rather than outcomes, downplayed quantification of risks, applied 
‘light-touch’ and deferential regulation, and failed to implement any penalties for breaches of 
rules and regulations.  Moreover, they created a false sense of security by producing reports 
that were overly optimistic and reassuring, regardless of the evidence base.  This was 
compounded by similar reports from the IMF, OECD and other bodies such as rating 
agencies and vested interest groups.  As the Honohan Report (2010) notes, Ireland’s banking 
performance was the second poorest after Iceland during the present global downturn, and 
was entirely homemade on the basis of the Irish construction boom, rather than exposure to 
sub-prime mortgages or aggressive overseas acquisitions. 
 
The frenzy of house building were exacerbated by the dispersed deployment of strong 
discourses around home-ownership and buy-to-let or flip speculation, combined with a 
simultaneous retreat from social housing provision.  Ireland has a relatively high rate of 
home ownership, with almost three quarters of private dwellings in the State being owner-
occupied in 2006 and  the housing boom was almost exclusively targeted at the home owners 
and investors, with: first time buyers feeling harried to get onto the property ladder at all 
costs (driven by arguments such as ‘being left behind’ and ‘rent is dead money’); existing 
home owners encouraged to take advantage of the equity in their homes to scale-up or 
purchase second or holiday homes or release equity to enable their children to get onto the 
housing ladder; and small investors encouraged to invest in buy-to-let purchases as a long 
term, secure investments that lacked the volatility of stocks and shares.  The latter group 
were particularly important in keeping demand high and pushing up prices.  By 2007, the 
Bank of Ireland Group were lending as much money to buy-to-let and flip speculators (28%) 
as to first time buyers, with the Irish Banking Federation noting that they typically paid 
c.€100,000 more on a property purchase (Brawn 2009).     
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Thus, Irish neoliberalism exhibits a particular form of path dependency, which is indicative 
of both a commonsense approach to neoliberalization and the avoidance of its contradictions.  
While the Irish state essentially bought into a free market ideology, the implementation of 
neoliberal policies and reforms in the property market were at the same time undermined by 
folding them into a system of entrenched localism, cronyism, and low-level corruption, both 
perpetuated and exacerbated by the interwoven short-term policy goals of the political 
system, and the unsustainable circulation of capital between banks, developers, and investors.  
Thus, a range of state interventions in the property market perpetuated the privileging of the 
property market in geographic areas where essentially there was no market, and supported 
the capitalist accumulation of a small range of interests (who had close political ties) to the 
ultimate detriment of more sustainable redistribution of Celtic Tiger wealth.  As O’Hearn 
(1998: page xi) observed, “[t]he main benefactors of growth – foreign computer firms and 
Irish professionals – disposed of most of their fortunes in ways that were either fruitless (in 
the case of profits removed from Ireland) or downright harmful (property speculation that 
drove the costs of housing through the roof)”.   
 
The result of these various factors, underpinned by a neoliberal philosophy of free market 
development and market-led regulation, was a housing bubble. Whilst many of the factors we 
have discussed do not differ greatly from the role that property development and speculation 
plays in many nations undergoing neoliberalisation, the ways in which these factors were 
articulated in Ireland was also contingent upon its particularities.  The sheer frenzy around 
home-ownership was clearly a latent outcome of a postcolonial anxiety around land.  Rather 
than being a mere footnote illustrating the more recent (and thus important) histories 
explaining the property boom, the postcolonial context was in fact integral to how it was 
produced and sustained over time; without the widespread desire for home-ownership at any 
cost, the ever escalating market could not have been sustained for as long as it was.  
Similarly, the inherent localism and cronyism of Irish politics produced a series of affects 
that structured the property sector, its geographical manifestation, and the architecture of its 
downfall.  Ireland provided a lubricated laboratory for neoliberal expansion, wherein 
resistance to these reforms were minimal, and their articulation exhibits a type of path 
amplification that mutates both Ireland and the ‘neoliberal’.  The variants of neoliberalism 
produced  must be seen in light of these historic specificities, but cannot be reduced to that 
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which is predictable or foreseeable.  Ireland’s geography and the ‘neoliberal’ mutate together 
and amplify each other. 
 
The Government’s Solution to the Banking and Property Crisis: NAMA 
The government’s response to the banking and property crisis in Ireland has been 
characteristic of the short-termist and reactionary modus operandi of Irish politics that then 
unfolds into a de facto longer term response (O’Toole 2009; Ross 2009).  Rather than rethink 
the Irish economic model, the solution to the crisis has employed a deepening of 
neoliberalised policy designed on the one hand to protect as much as possible the interests of 
the developer and financial class, and on the other to implement widescale austerity measures 
and severe cutbacks in public services and to consider the privatization of state assets, all 
framed within a post-political discourse of ‘there is no alternative’.  While this is perhaps 
unsurprising given the prevalence of similarly hermetic responses elsewhere, and 
neoliberalism’s ability to mutate to reinforce certain types of class power at the expense of 
others (Harvey 2007; see also Fox-Rogers et al 2011 for a review of how changes in Irish 
planning law reinforces class bias), in particularly utilising and mobilising crisis as a way of 
solidifying these arrangements (Klein, 2008; Zizek, 2010), it is worthwhile to elaborate 
empirically on how such processes were operationalised and rationalised in the Irish context 
with respect to property. 
 
The government’s initial reaction to the faltering economy was to insist that the banks were 
well capitalised and that the housing market would slow to ‘soft landing’.  However, as the 
crisis deepened and liquidity started to dry up on the international money markets, it became 
clear that there were significant problems of capitalisation in the Irish banking sector.  Banks 
neither had the funds to lend to investors and businesses, nor to pay back loans to 
international banks.  Irish bank share prices collapsed (between May 2007 and November 
2008 Irish shares fell in value from €55b to €4b) resulting in the introduction of a state 
backed bank guarantee scheme to prevent a run on the banks, wherein the state underwrote 
€440b of deposits and other assets (Murphy and Devlin 2009).  Property buyers and 
investors, already cautious because of the slow down in the housing market, found it 
increasingly difficult to source credit, thus developers found themselves left with liquidity 
problems that prevented them from finishing out developments.  If evidence was needed of 
the failure of the neoliberal model not only to provide equitable redistribution, but also to 
support those interests most central to its functioning, this case offered a clear example.  In 
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order to introduce liquidity into the Irish banking system the state took a two-pronged 
approach: (1) direct recapitalisation or nationalisation, wherein the state took a stake in the 
banks for preferential shares or took direct ownership, using the national pension reserve and 
finance procured on the international markets; (2) relieving the banks of their toxic assets by 
purchasing all property loans of €5m or more issued before December 1st 2008 and placing 
them in a new state agency to manage on behalf of the taxpayer.  Somewhat controversially, 
all Irish banks were to participate in the strategy adopted, meaning that the two institutions 
with the smallest depositor base and largest portfolio of toxic debt (Anglo Irish Bank and 
Irish Nationwide) were protected from being wound down. 
 
The new property agency to manage the second scheme is the National Assets Management 
Agency (NAMA), part of the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA).  Plans for 
NAMA were announced in the Minister for Finance’s Supplementary Budget on 7th April 
2009, with the National Asset Management Agency Bill (2009) published September 10th of 
that year.  The Bill enables NAMA to acquire bank assets relating to land and development 
loans and associated loans, and to manage those assets for the benefit of the taxpayer.  The 
first loans were transferred from the banks to NAMA in March 29th 2010 (NAMA 2010a).   
 
The NAMA Draft Business Plan (2009) details that in total, €88bn worth of assets with a 
loan book of  €77bn and €9bn in rolled up interest, are being transferred to NAMA from five 
Irish banks (AIB - €24.1bn, Bank of Ireland - €15.5bn, EBS - €0.8bn, Irish Nationwide - 
€8.3bn, and Anglo Irish Bank - €28.4bn): €27.8bn (36%) relates to ‘land’, €21.8bn (28%) 
relates to ‘development loans’, €27.7bn (36%) relates to ‘associated loans’.  In return for the 
impaired assets, the agency issues the five banks with government-backed bonds, which the 
banks could use to borrow from the European Central Bank, and thus, in theory at least, 
inject liquidity into the Irish banking system.  Rather than paying present market value of the 
underlying assets, NAMA paid 15% more to represent long term economic value.  Based on 
the first payments to banks, the state is paying on average 50% of the loan value for the asset 
(NAMA 2010b), though the developer will continue to repay the full value of the loan.  
NAMA estimates that 40% of the loans will be cashflow generating and that 80% of loans 
will be repaid by borrowers, with 20% defaulting.  NAMA has up to €5bn to selectively 
spend on completing projects.   
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At present, there is very little detail available with respect to the 22,000 loans that have been 
transferred into NAMA and the properties they relate to, nor the specific geography beyond 
national territories (see Table 1).  As a consequence, it is difficult to determine the present 
status of assets and their future potential worth.   
 
Table 1: Geographical breakdown of NAMA portfolio 
 L&D 
loans 
Associated 
loans 
Total % of total 
Ireland 33.13 18.35 51.48 66.80% 
Northern Ireland 3.29 1.51 4.8 6.20% 
Great Britain 10.34 5.59 15.93 20.70% 
USA 1.39 0.66 2.05 2.70% 
Germany 0.05 1.01 1.06 1.40% 
Portugal 0.46 0.14 0.6 0.70% 
France 0.39 0.13 0.52 0.70% 
Czech Republic 0.11 0.07 0.18 0.20% 
Italy 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.20% 
Spain 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.20% 
Other 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.30% 
TOTAL (€ billions) 49.38 27.73 77.11 100.00% 
 
Source: NAMA (2009) 
 
Since its announcement, the NAMA project has been roundly criticized by politicians and 
economists (see for example, Gurdgiev 2010, Lyons 2010, Lucey 2010, McWilliams 2010, 
Whelan 2010b).  There is a broad concern as to whether NAMA has been the right vehicle to 
deal with the property crisis and whether it can succeed given the make-up of the portfolio 
(particularly given the geography of assets and the amount of land and redundant property 
such as ‘zombie hotels’), the extent of the property crash, the sums being paid by the state to 
the banks for their ‘assets’, the validity of ascribed long-term economic values and rent 
yields, and the veracity of valuations and underlying economic models and calculations.  
Others question the fact that NAMA has paid a notional long term economic value rate rather 
than present market prices, thus second guessing the market and inflating the transfer to the 
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banks at the state’s risk; and that to recover the state investment the property market will 
need to be re-inflated, which will mean the re-inflation of the surrounding apparatus of 
interests in banking, property, planning, and government.    Moreover, if land is purchased by 
the state on the basis of existing zoning then any future dezoning by local authorities will 
deflate its value and lead to a loss on the investment.   
 
For those on the Right, NAMA represents state interference in the logic of the free market, 
disrupting its ‘natural’ recovery by artificially controlling large elements of the property 
market and protecting failed developers and speculators in the short term who otherwise 
would have gone bust, thus blocking the growth of more resilient players or new start-ups.  
For those on the Left it protects those who created the crisis but it does nothing to protect 
home owners and tenants struggling to pay mortgages and rent and who are also underwriting 
NAMA’s costs.  Moreover, it is employing as experts (bankers, estate agents, property 
consultants, planners, lawyers) the very same people who acted irresponsibly to create the 
bubble, some of whom are overseeing transfers from their former employers.  These experts 
are being handsomely rewarded for their services, with fees expecting to run to €2.46bn over 
the projected ten year life course of the agency (NAMA 2009).  Further, NAMA is exempt 
from freedom of information requests and despite managing a vast amount of state managed 
assets it is particularly opaque in its operation.   
 
Interestingly, very few of the critiques of NAMA question the underlying neoliberal ideology 
that underpins the creation and operation of the agency and the whole Irish economic model.  
Indeed, there seems to be widespread acceptance that the core logics and principles 
underpinning Ireland’s economy during the Celtic Tiger period were fundamentally sound, 
and that the crisis and crash were simply the result of misfortune with respect to the timing of 
the global financial crisis, poor management and regulation, and cronyism and greed (in 
other words, how it was (mis)applied).  In general then, criticisms do not extend to the Irish 
economic model, with its narrow tax base of low corporate and income tax, high indirect 
taxes, and lack of property taxes, and its laissez fair approach to planning and regulation.  As 
Marcuse (2009) has noted, “todays-more-than-financial-crisis” is being rationalised away as 
an anomaly within the system of neoliberal capitalism, a cog to be corrected rather than 
indicative of more systemic failures. 
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 In Ireland, as with other countries, the solutions to the crisis are a selection of alternative 
tactics wherein the overall strategy is a new round of neoliberalisation.  In other words, rather 
than seeking radical (or even moderate) change with respect to the economic, political and 
planning systems, a fresh dose of neoliberalisation is seen as the solution to the failings of 
previous rounds of neoliberalism.  The apparatus that created the conditions for crisis are not 
only left in place, their positions are strengthened through affirmation.  Harvey (2007) argues 
that the neoliberal project was designed as a means to restore class power to an elite by 
strategically aligning state resources and supports to this strata of society.  The Irish state’s 
response to the crisis supports this argument.  It is indicative of free market fundamentalism 
“losing both its claim to legitimacy and its claims on democracy” (Giroux and Searls Giroux, 
2009, page 1), having to abandon the assumption that markets can operate in the absence of 
state interventions.  In Ireland, we are now witnessing the rolling out of public money and 
resources to rescue poorly performing private institutions and restore a faulty system from 
ruin, an example of what we term “accumulation by repossession”.  In a period of ‘roll with 
it’ neoliberalism (Keil, 2009), the investment in these types of responses has reached a point 
where it is less politically contentious to continue to invest in these ideologically 
contradictory responses of state regulated free-markets than to either follow through on the 
promise of the free-market or to implement more socially responsible models.   
 
Conclusion  
This paper has sought to bring the Irish economic ‘miracle’ which prevailed between 1993 
and 2007 and its spectacular collapse since 2008, into dialogue with recent literature on 
neoliberalism, its actually existing forms, and its path trajectories in specific and concrete 
milieu. Given its pivotal status in global debate on fast track growth in small open economies 
and on the causes and consequences of collapse and crises, we note a surprising absence in 
academic literature of sustained conversation between the Irish case and theoretical 
ruminations over neoliberalism and its political pretensions today. This paper stands as a 
contribution towards the filling of this lacuna. Our discussion has focussed upon the causes 
of the massive property orgy that Ireland indulged in at the height of its prowess as a Celtic 
Tiger, the disastrous social and spatial costs and consequences that this glut has left in its 
wake, and the (re)commitment to neoliberal policies which proposed solutions to Ireland’s 
property crises betray.  
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At one level, the follies, excess, gluttony, greed, defaults, bankruptcies, repossessions, and 
bail outs, which have marked Irish life in the past two decades reflect simply the cultural 
flotsam and jetsam of a classic crises of over-accumulation. Inherent in the capitalist system 
is a tendency towards over-accumulation, signposted by a series of desperate displacement 
strategies which include the switching of capital from primary circuits to secondary circuits 
and in particular into land and property. Overheated housing markets are emblematic of the 
endemic and innate drift of capitalism into spatially and temporally specific crises which are 
then exacerbated by capitalism’s will to find what turn out to be fallacious solutions. 
Ireland’s particular and dramatic encounter with the creative and destructive powers of 
unregulated and insufficiently regulated market processes is but the latest chapter in the now 
well populated and inglorious history of capitalism and property bubbles more widely.  
Ireland’s crises are simply capitalism’s crises rendered visible and naked. 
 
But Ireland’s story was home grown too. Both fiscal and planning policy formation, 
implementation and regulation were overtly shaped by the neoliberal policies adopted by the 
state, particularly in the period from 1997 onwards.  During this time, the government 
pursued a neoliberal agenda of promoting the free market, minimising regulation, privatising 
public goods, and keeping direct taxes low and indirect taxes high.  The state thus loosened 
regulation of the financial sector, introduced tax incentive schemes, changed the parameters 
of stamp duty, lowered capital gains tax, allowed developers to forego their affordable and 
social housing obligations, promoted a laissez faire planning system, failed to address the 
vestiges of clientelism and allowed elected representatives to abandon basic planning 
principles, and encouraged local authorities to produce ambitious, localised growth plans 
framed within a zero-sum game of potentially being left behind with respect to development.  
In short, it allowed the property sector to be driven by developers, speculators and banks, 
rewarding them with tax incentives, less tax obligations, and market-led regulation; it 
enabled buyers to over-extend their indebtedness; and it provided too few barriers to 
development by failing to adequately oversee, regulate and direct local planning. Whilst the 
global financial crisis might have been a contributing factor, the Irish housing market was 
already running out of control, with supply outstripping potential demand in all parts of the 
country, and house and land prices skyrocketing to amongst the most expensive in the world.  
And banks had massively over-extended themselves lending to developers.  The crash was 
inevitable.  The severity of the crash was significantly exacerbated by the state’s neoliberal 
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agenda and lack of oversight, foresight and poor policy formation with respect to both the 
planning system and banking sectors. 
 
In mobilising the idea of actually existing neoliberalism we have made a case for widening 
the laboratories within which the grounding of neoliberalism is scrutinised. We have argued 
that the vital context which has mediated Ireland’s specific encounter with neoliberal 
doctrines has been Irish attachments to land and property, Ireland’s coloration by clientalistic 
and patronage politics, the dominance of right of centre political parties that prioritize 
localism, and the desire for a FDI dominated, open economy that collectively helped broker 
the rise and fall of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger economy, and have given the property bubble and 
its implosion a unique Irish fingerprint.  We have characterised Irish neoliberalism then as a 
common sense, partial, happenstance and emergent piling up of market oriented policy 
orientations, strategies, and instruments, framed within its localist, clientelist political culture 
and system that operates across modes and scales of governance. 
 
In framing Ireland’s encounter with neoliberalism in terms of the country’s emergence from 
a troublesome colonial past we are not of course suggesting that Ireland is particularly 
exceptional. It may be that Ireland’s puzzling conservative revolution, its brand of 
clientalistic and patronage politics, its culture of reverence towards and deferral to property 
rights, and its rejection of import substitution and embrace of open markets, resonates with 
other states emerging from a colonial experience. To the extent that the social, cultural, 
economic, and political milieu in which neoliberalism took root in Ireland might be more 
typical than unique, arguably the theoretical innovations piloted in this paper assume wider 
significance. Whilst to date much work on actually existing neoliberalism has focussed upon 
the creative destruction of institutions of urban governance in the western city, the Irish case 
may well serve to invigorate a fresh focus upon neoliberalism’s journeys in states who still 
carry the imprint of their colonial past and where colonial and postcolonial histories provides 
the essential context in which the structuration of the neoliberal experiment takes place. The 
Irish case can be located against the backdrop of neoliberalism’s early experimentation in 
Structural Adjustment Programmes, but it clearly surpasses, extends, and suggests new 
directions, for scholarship with this parentage. 
 
In concluding we ruminate on the wider significance of the Irish case for critical human 
geographies of actually existing neoliberalism in the context of the global economic crises. 
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To this end we offer three concepts which emerge from the Irish story but which may have 
wider resonance and might constitute a useful fleshing out of theoretical framings of concrete 
and particular neoliberalisms; path amplification, neoliberalism’s topologies and 
topographies and accumulation by repossession. 
 
Firstly, the concept of path trajectories and path dependencies have become important 
denotations of the place specific character of local and particular neoliberalisms and their 
development. Because emphases to date has tended to be focussed upon neoliberalism’s  
working on antecedent city-based Fordist Kenyesian institutions and infrastructures the 
concept of creative destruction has tended to be foregrounded, both cerebrally and viscerally. 
The idea of creative destruction itself implies that to move forward neoliberalism has to 
destroy prior spatial and ideological fixes. The idea of neoliberalism’s path trajectories and 
path dependencies has become preoccupied with ideas of friction and inertia; obstacles have 
to be overcome. Given Ireland’s unique social, cultural, economic, and political history 
arguably neoliberalism encountered a more conducive incubator. Perhaps for this reason it 
did not have to become an overtly political and ideological project as such and was paraded 
as little more than commonsense. To counter assumptions of friction, inertia, and stases 
which can unwittingly pervade concepts such as path dependency and path trajectory we 
offer the idea of path amplification. In some spaces and places neoliberalism finds itself in 
harmony with, rather than in opposition to, prior institutional histories and can germinate 
exponentially and benefit from local amplification.     
 
Secondly, whilst much work to date has focused upon geographies of neoliberalism it is 
equally the case that neoliberalism produces its own geographies. We refer to this as 
neoliberalisms topographies and topologies. All too often the full significance of these 
geographies and their importance in conditioning the subsequent path trajectories of 
neoliberalism are insufficiently understood; where they are ill defined and under specified 
notions of uneven development are mobilised. The importance of debates over ghost estates 
and zombie hotels to the future trajectory of neoliberalism in Ireland merits attention. 
Alongside Dubai and Japan, Ireland might become the most appropriate laboratory within 
which to study the impact of such haunted landscapes of despair on the future of neoliberal 
thinking and its possible mutations.   The growth in the Irish housing market, both in terms of 
revenue and land-use, and subsequent crash and legacy of oversupply, has had an era-
defining impact on Irish society and space.  It has affected all aspects of social and economic 
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life in urban and rural communities leaving in its wake a topology of vacancy, unfinished 
estates, and empty offices and retail parks and a topography of broken lives, shattered 
dreams, terminal indebtedness, and for some chronic stress, anxiety, depression, and even 
suicide. Neoliberalism’s spatial imprint needs to be considered as central to its structuration, 
both before and during the present crises.  
 
Finally, worryingly, the present government’s solution to the crisis has been another round of 
short-termist neoliberalism in the form of the public collectivization of private debt through 
detoxification, recapitalisation, and nationalisation of the banks and the protection of the 
interests of developers and speculators at the potential expense of the taxpayer.  We are 
entering it seems a period in which capitalism is folding in on itself, where perhaps one 
would expect it to implode, instead it regenerates and thrives on its own contradictions; ‘the 
more it breaks down, the more it schizophrenizes, the better it works’ (Deleuze and Guattarri, 
1977, 166).  We are seemingly entering a period of paranoid, schizoid, and cynical neoliberal 
capitalism, wherein any utopian dream of efficiency through markets, democracy through 
accumulation, has been lost within the scrapheap of the international crisis. Ireland has been 
buried under this detritus more than most.  According to Harvey, the recent history of 
neoliberalism can be read as a decisive development in class war over the division of the 
national product. Through what Harvey calls accumulation by dispossession, capital has 
reversed the gains to labour which were ushered in with the Fordist Keynesian state and 
restored inequalities in wealth to Victorian levels. In Ireland’s case capital is being saved 
from its later folly not only by the privatisation of social assets but also by the socialisation 
of private loss. Productive state assets are to be deployed to save and in some cases further 
(perhaps more than we currently know about) enrich capital, whilst capital’s losses are to 
become the public’s losses. We suggest the concept of accumulation by repossession to 
capture this latest development and offer it as an accompaniment to Harvey’s concept of 
accumulation by dispossession.  
 
In the present-post political climate of manufactured amnesia it is useful to remind ourselves 
that a different future remains possible, despite the fact that Ireland’s neoliberal state seems 
presently incapable of envisioning and embracing another future.  Indeed, it is somewhat 
ironic that in many ways the Irish state has never been better placed to choose a different 
future given the state ownership of huge tracts of land and property, along with the country’s 
primary banking institutions.  The era of neoliberalism, however, has also seismically    
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shifted the context of the state into which such reforms/reclamations would need to be 
implemented.  Gleeson (2010), in his book Lifeboat Cities, likens the past thirty years of 
welfare retrenchment and the rise to prominence of neoliberal rule as akin to being 
‘handcuffed to a madman’. During this period Gleeson suggests, we have witnessed a period 
of reconstitution in which socio-spatial relations have degenerated such that they are no 
longer fit for purpose for human flourishing. For Gleeson, the global economic downturn has 
raised the stakes and created new opportunities. No longer must the call to resist or contest 
neoliberalism rest on an agenda of moderate reform. The scale of the task is now so great, 
and the sense of urgency so crushing that much more ambition thinking is required. Perhaps 
the core of the problems lies in what Žižek (2002, page 152) considers as the difference 
between the capacity of states and individuals to React and to Act: “An act always involves a 
radical risk ... it is a step into the open, with no guarantee of the final outcome ... [b]ecause an 
Act retroactively changes the very co-ordinates into which it intervenes”.  Thus far, the Irish 
response to the crisis – like that of many other nations – has been to React rather than to Act, 
thus exhibiting a fundamental conservatism that seeks to recover rather than reform.  To 
certain extent this is now inevitable given the complex interweaving of political and 
economic geographies, the new post-crisis relational geo-political configurations both within 
and external to the Eurozone, and the embrace of the IMF/ECB bailout, that enable and 
constrain the ground on which national institutions can react to and act upon the crisis.  But 
perhaps, only in taking that step into the unknown can Ireland begin the search for the 
opportunity inherent within crisis.   
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